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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consumers appear skeptical of arbitration, and nowhere is this 
mistrust more evident than with respect to health care.  Critics 
 
†  J.D. Candidate December 2004, William Mitchell College of Law; M.S., 
Education, Northwestern University, 1996; B.A., History, Carleton College, 1992. 
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often say that when patients forgo their right to sue, the health care 
industry strips them of a valuable right at a time when they might 
be at their most vulnerable.  Despite this apparent lack of 
consumer confidence, many Managed Care Organizations 
(MCOs)1 and private physicians are trying to contain the rising 
costs of health care by asking patients to give up their rights to sue 
prior to receiving insurance coverage or medical care.2  In addition, 
some state legislatures are enacting laws aimed at directing health-
related claims to arbitration,3 and both state and federal courts 
continue to give Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) a ringing 
endorsement.4 
While the critics of arbitration seem to have the loudest voices, 
preliminary studies show that the majority of patients are still 
willing to sign the agreements.5  Skeptics assume that for a wronged 
 
 1. Patricia I. Carter, Binding Arbitration in Malpractice Disputes:  The Right 
Prescription of HMO Patients?, HAMLINE J. PUB. & POL’Y 423, 424-25 (1997) (defining 
managed care as “a combination of techniques intended to assure that the covered 
individuals receive the most appropriate level and duration of care at the most 
appropriate price”).  Managed care programs take a variety of forms, including 
Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO), Health Maintenance Organizations 
(HMO), and Individual Practice Organizations (IPO).  Id. at 425.  Twenty percent 
of Americans are members of HMOs.  Id.  While HMOs have been the most 
financially successful, they are the most restrictive in retaining control over the 
price and quantity of health care services they provide to their members.  Id. at 
426.  This article will refer generally to Managed Care Organizations (MCO) as 
encompassing the different types of organizations. 
 2. See, e.g., Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice 
Claims, 24 A.L.R.5th 1, 1 (1994) (stating that “because of what has been 
characterized as a ‘medical malpractice insurance crisis,’ contributed to by the cost 
of litigation and large jury verdicts in medical malpractice actions, attention has 
focused on arbitration as a less expensive and more efficient method of dispute 
resolution”); Carter, supra note 1, at 424 (noting that the health care industry is 
under public pressure to limit rising health care costs and that by incorporating 
binding arbitration agreements into member services contracts with patients, 
managed care organizations have been able to reduce their costs in the manner of 
handling disputes with patients); Jane Spencer, Signing Away Your Right to Sue—In 
Significant Legal Shift, Doctors, Gyms, Cable Services Start to Require Arbitration, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 1, 2003, at D1 (stating that in an effort to fend off a growing number of 
lawsuits, more and more companies are asking consumers to sign “mandatory 
arbitration” agreements and waive their right to sue the company in the event a 
dispute should arise).     
 3. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (Michie 2003); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
15/1-14 (2004). 
 4. See infra Part III.A. 
       5.    Interview with Keith Maurer, Associate General Counsel, National 
Arbitration Forum (Jan. 30, 2004).  In one Florida hospital, during the first month 
of a program offering arbitration agreements, 1576 out of 2683, or nearly sixty 
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party arbitration provides a less-than-adequate substitute for the 
court system.6  In addition, skeptics believe that providers put 
arbitration clauses into contracts only to benefit corporations at the 
expense of the individual bringing a claim.7  Legal grounds for 
patients’ attacks on arbitration agreements most often rest on 
assertions that MCOs and private physicians are stripping them of 
the right to due process by coercing them into signing something 
they do not want to sign.8  Similarly, arbitration opponents often 
argue that courts should not enforce such agreements after a 
dispute arises because such an agreement is unconscionable under 
basic contract principles.9  This anti-arbitration approach runs 
counter to a growing body of statutory and case law at the federal 
and state levels favoring arbitration as a fair and efficient means to 
resolve disputes.10  The assumption that signing an arbitration 
agreement precludes patients from being able to rectify wrongs 
through legal channels also overlooks the fact that arbitration does 
not prevent parties from obtaining compensation for civil wrongs; 
it simply provides a different forum for dispute resolution. 
In fact, many feel that arbitration is not only a different forum, 
but also a better option for would-be litigants.11  Numerous 
 
percent of admissions chose to sign the agreement.  The percentage has 
continued to climb.  Id. 
 6. Interview with Roger S. Haydock, Director, Institute for Advanced Dispute 
Resolution; Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; Director, National 
Arbitration Forum in Minneapolis, Minn. (Oct. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Haydock 
Interview]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee 
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 53 
(1997) (noting the commonality of the health industry requiring customers to 
agree to binding arbitration as a condition of receiving health services); Spencer, 
supra note 2, at D1. 
 9. See infra Part III.C (discussing how courts have interpreted arbitration 
agreements in health care contracts).  See also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the 
unconscionability analysis used by courts to assess the validity of certain contract 
clauses). 
 10. See Roger S. Haydock & Jennifer D. Henderson, Arbitration and Judicial 
Civil Justice: An American Historical Review and a Proposal for a Private/Arbitral and 
Public/Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 176 (2002) (stating that 
over the course of the seventy-five years since the enactment of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), both Congress and the United States Supreme Court have 
demonstrated clear support of the expanded use of arbitration as an accessible, 
affordable, and fair way to resolve disputes and provide civil justice relief for 
everyone in American society). 
 11. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) 
(“[B]y agreeing to arbitrate . . . a party does not forgo the substantive rights . . . ; it 
3
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arbitration supporters believe that arbitration is inherently a better 
way to resolve disputes because it is faster, cheaper, and at least as 
fair as litigation.12  Some argue that the expense of litigation, 
combined with the minute chance that one’s case will actually get 
to trial, has essentially rendered the tort system inaccessible to the 
average litigant.13  Under this view, the right to arbitrate a dispute is 
more valuable to a potential claimant than the right to sue, and the 
absence of an arbitration clause takes away that right.14 
Those who oppose arbitration clauses in health care contracts 
as being a way for the health care industry to exploit consumers 
must recognize that ADR may be a better option for patients with a 
dispute.  While this may be true, a well-developed body of contract 
law dictates that patients must be able to enter into an agreement 
to arbitrate without being coerced.  Drafters must carefully word 
contracts between patients and health care providers to reflect the 
need to protect consumers. 
While patients and consumer advocates must have an open 
mind about the possible benefits of ADR, the onus is on the health 
care industry to provide a balance between advocating for ADR and 
protecting patients’ due process rights.  The industry must create 
an environment in which patients see arbitration as a superior 
option to litigation.  Health care providers must provide the 
 
only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 12. Haydock & Henderson, supra note 10, at 191; see also Schwartz, supra note 
8, at 67. 
 13. Haydock & Henderson, supra note 10, at 191.   
A system that costs a lot of money to participate in, takes way too 
long to reach a final decision, requires help from a monopolistic 
profession, and may include unpredictable and inadequately 
knowledgeable decision makers has to be avoided.  It can only serve 
the rich and those that can wait a long time for results which they 
can afford to appeal and wait even longer. 
Id.  See also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a 
System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (focusing on why settlement 
is so pervasive in today’s society).  Out of the hundreds of thousands of civil 
lawsuits that are filed each year, the great majority are settled and only a small 
percentage are tried to a jury or a judge.  Id.  Some proposed reasons for this 
phenomenon include, scarcity of judges, the ability of the parties themselves to 
control settlement, and the fact that adversary fact-finding is expensive and 
unpredictable.  Id. at 3.  As a result of these factors, Gross and Sylverud contend 
that the savings realized by settling privately—in time, money, and risk—are 
greater in the current system than they would be in a quicker, cheaper, and more 
predictable system.  Id. at 4. 
 14. Haydock & Henderson, supra note 10, at 191. 
4
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necessary education, carefully drafted contracts, and appropriate 
procedural safeguards fundamental to a viable system of ADR.  If 
doctors, hospitals, and MCOs are vigilant in implementing these 
goals, patients will likely flow with the tide of pro-arbitration 
sentiment currently sweeping the nation’s courts and lawmakers. 
This article will begin by describing the peculiar nature of the 
analysis of arbitration clauses in health care contracts, including 
the complexity that arises when trying to categorize issues as 
sounding in either tort or contract.15  Next, the article will examine 
both statutory and case law governing arbitration agreements in 
general, how courts have analyzed arbitration agreements under 
the substantive law of contract,16 and how courts have applied that 
analysis to arbitration clauses in health-related contracts.17  Lastly, 
the article will propose some concrete steps providers can take to 
correct the sort of appearance of impropriety that causes critics, 
commentators, and patients themselves to be suspicious of these 
agreements.18 
II. THE COMPLEXITY OF ANALYZING HEALTH CARE CONTRACTS: 
CONTRACT OR TORT? 
Maintaining high quality while containing the rising costs of 
medical care is at the root of every health care contract.19  Often, 
disputes that arise from these agreements can be contract claims, 
tort claims, or both.20  The line between where an insurance-related 
contract dispute ends and where a malpractice claim begins is often 
fuzzy.  Courts, however, must often characterize issues as being one 
or the other, thus dictating a patient’s remedies.21 
To illustrate the problem, a “contract” decision made by an 
MCO may result in a physical injury to a patient, and thus the two 
 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part III.A-B. 
 17. See infra Part III.C. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See Crocca, supra note 2, at 1. 
 20. Id. at 24.  See also Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and Standard Form 
Contracts: Distinguishing Patient Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 24 (1998) (“managed care brought together 
elements of health insurance and patient care that traditionally have been 
handled separately by the law”). 
 21. See Mariner, supra note 20, at 24.  For example, in Corcoran v. United 
HealthCare, Inc., the court held that United HealthCare in fact made medical 
decisions, but only in the context of the availability of benefits.  965 F.2d 1321, 
1331 (5th Cir. 1992).  Therefore, any tort actions were preempted by ERISA.  Id. 
5
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areas of law bleed together in a sometimes indiscernible way.22  In 
analyzing the validity of binding arbitration clauses, courts may 
apply the same legal principles that govern standard commercial 
agreements to health care contracts.23  However, those same courts 
will use tort law when assessing whether a health care professional 
provided care to a patient that conforms to the standard of care 
required in a certain community.24  This dual approach can be 
problematic in cases involving benefit decisions that influence 
patient care because “benefit decisions are typically governed by 
contract, while patient care decisions are typically governed by tort 
law.”25  If contracts govern “benefit” decisions, then it is essentially 
impossible to hold a health plan accountable for its influence on 
quality of care.26  The courts’ approach to these types of decisions 
raises questions as to whether analyzing claims under the rubric of 
contract strips patients of their rights against their MCO that would 
normally be grounded in tort.27 
Take, for example, the question of whether the choice to use 
one particular hospital instead of another should be considered a 
decision about particular benefits a patient is entitled to (a contract 
issue), or about the quality of care he or she will receive at the 
hospital (a tort issue).  In Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan Inc., 
physicians agreed that a man who suffered a heart attack should 
have surgery at a St. Louis hospital because the hospitals in Kansas 
City did not have adequate equipment.28  The health plan denied 
 
 22. See Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089, 1093-94 (Pa. 2001) (holding that 
ERISA did not preempt the medical malpractice claim against the HMO in light of 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision of Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 228-29 
(2000)).  The Pappas court explains the three types of decisions that HMO 
professionals make, as defined by the Supreme Court in Pegram.  These decisions 
include: pure “eligibility decisions,” which turn on a plan’s coverage of a particular 
condition; “treatment decisions,” which are those that involve determining the 
appropriate medical response given a patient’s symptoms; and “mixed eligibility 
and treatment decisions,” where coverage and medical judgment are intertwined.  
Pappas, 768 A.2d at 1093-94. 
 23. Crocca, supra note 2, at 25. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Mariner, supra note 20, at 24-25. 
 26. See id. at 26.  Mariner points out some other ways that managed care 
organizations can influence patient care.  For example, health care plans 
sometimes offer advice and assistance in selecting physicians, they may encourage 
their members to use preventive care services, or they may create incentives for 
health care providers themselves to recommend certain drugs or treatments.  Id. at 
27. 
 27. See id. at 28. 
 28. Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat’l Health Plan, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 300 (8th Cir. 1993). 
6
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him that opportunity, stating that he had to use one of its listed 
providers, but changed its mind several weeks later.29  By the time 
the surgical team at the St. Louis hospital was available to perform 
the surgery, Kuhl’s heart had deteriorated beyond repair.30  Kuhl 
died in December 1989, before the health plan had made its final 
decision about whether it would cover a transplant, and his wife 
sued the plan for medical malpractice.31  The Eighth Circuit held 
that there was no valid malpractice claim because the plan did not 
make a medical decision per se; rather the court characterized the 
claim for denial of benefits as sounding in contract law rather than 
tort.32 
The court’s decision in Kuhl fails to recognize the medical 
treatment choices made by the plan in the process of denying 
benefits.33  Simply because the provider’s decision was not 
specifically about what benefits Kuhl was entitled to receive, but 
where he would receive them, the substance of the decision should 
not remove the claim from the realm of tort law.34 
An arbitration clause may not directly address standards of 
patient care, but courts have acknowledged that the relationship 
between a patient and his or her health care provider is one that 
requires protection.35  Thus, the courts have scrutinized these 
agreements carefully and have approached health care contracts as 
being ones of adhesion.36  The delicate nature of negotiating for 
health care and a patient’s ability to seek redress for wrongs may 
partially explain some of the trepidation people feel in signing 
arbitration clauses. 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. at 303. 
 33. Mariner, supra note 20, at 26. 
 34. Id. (stating that at the very least, the plan’s decision about what hospital 
Kuhl was entitled to use had elements of medical judgment for a covered benefit 
because most plans would consider the quality of care in selecting hospitals with 
which to work). 
 35. Crocca, supra note 2, at 25. 
 36. Id. 
7
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III. ARBITRATION: LAW AND POLICY 
A.  Federal and State Arbitration Law 
In general, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs 
arbitration disputes.37  The United States Supreme Court has held 
that the FAA applies to all arbitrations involving interstate 
commerce, construing interstate commerce broadly and thereby 
encompassing most agreements.38  The FAA states that any 
arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”39  Courts have consistently 
acknowledged that Congress created a strong federal policy that 
favors arbitration agreements through the language of the FAA.40  
 
 37. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
 38. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 2037, 2040  (2003) (interpreting 
“the term ‘involving commerce’ in the FAA as the functional equivalent of the 
more familiar term ‘affecting commerce’—words of art that ordinarily signal the 
broadest permissible exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause power”); Allied-
Bruce Terminix, Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995) (stating that a broad 
interpretation of interstate commerce language “is consistent with the Act’s basic 
purpose, to put arbitration provisions on ‘the same footing’ as a contract’s other 
terms”); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987) (stating that a broad 
interpretation “embodies Congress’ intent to provide for the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause”); Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984) (holding that the requirement that the 
transaction involve commerce is a constitutionally necessary qualification on the 
FAA’s reach). 
 39. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).  This section of the FAA states in full: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or 
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement 
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of 
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. 
Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (holding that “it is the congressional policy manifested in the 
Federal Arbitration Act that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of 
arbitration agreements covered by that Act”); Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 15 
(stating that by implementing language that an arbitration provision is valid and 
irrevocable, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew 
power of the states to require a judicial forum for resolution of claims that the 
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. 
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23 n.27 (1983) (stating that “the policy of the 
8
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Given this government attitude favoring arbitration, courts 
resolving doubts as to the arbitrability of a claim must resolve any 
doubts in favor of arbitration.41 
State governments have joined Congress by incorporating 
aspects of the FAA into their own state laws, and crafting laws that 
address issues specifically related to arbitration.42  While state law 
governing arbitration can broaden the scope of arbitrable disputes, 
the Supreme Court has held that the FAA preempts state laws and 
 
Arbitration Act requires a liberal reading of arbitration agreements”). 
 41. Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 392 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that “[i]t is a well-established rule that any doubts regarding arbitrability should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration”); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 
992 F.2d 386, 388 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 42. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 9.43.10-.220 (Michie 2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
12-1501 to -1518 (West 2004); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-108-201 to -224 (WESTLAW 
through 2003 legislation); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to -409 (WESTLAW 
through 2003 legislation); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (WESTLAW 
through 2003 legislation); FLA. STAT. ch. 682.01-682.22 (WESTLAW through 2003 
legislation); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901 to -922 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2003 
legislation); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-5/23 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 
34-57-2-2 to -22 (West, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 
679A.1-.19 (West, WESTLAW through 2003 ch. 35) (recognized as preempted by 
Faber v. Menard, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Iowa 2003)); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
5-401 to -422 (WESTLAW through 2002 legislation); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
417.045-.240 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 9:4201-:4217 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-5949 (West, 
WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201 
to -234 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-
19 (West, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation ch. 9); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 
600.5001-.5035 (West, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); MINN. STAT. §§ 
572.08-.30 (WESTLAW through 2001 1st Spec. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-1 
to -37 (WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470 
(WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to -324 
(WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2601 to -2622 
(WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); NEV. REV. STAT. 38.015-.360 (1995); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23A-1 to -19 (West, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -22 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 7503-7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-569.1 to 
.31 (WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.2-01 to -20 
(1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-.16 (WESTLAW through 2003 
legislation); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 801-818 (WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); 
42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7301-7320 (1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-3-1 to -21 
(WESTLAW through 2002 legislation); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-25A-1 to -38 
(WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to -320 
(WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); TEX. CIV. PRAC & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 
171.001-.023 (Vernon 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31a-1 to -20 (1996); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5651-5681 (WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 8.01-581.01 to -.016 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); WYO. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2002 legislation). 
9
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policies regarding arbitration where state court rulings or statutes 
are contrary or more restrictive.43  In Perry v. Thomas, the Supreme 
Court held: 
State law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is 
applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning 
the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts 
generally.  A state-law principle that takes its meaning 
precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at 
issue does not comport with [the text] of [the FAA].44 
Therefore, while states may invalidate an arbitration clause 
“upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity of the revocation of 
any contract” under section 2 of the FAA, a state cannot “decide 
that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, 
service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration 
clause.”45 
While the FAA preempts state statutory schemes that are more 
restrictive, state contract principles apply to whether agreements to 
arbitrate are valid and enforceable, just as they would to any other 
contract dispute arising under state law.46  As the Seventh Circuit 
stated in Stone v. Doerge, decided in May 2003: 
Nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act overrides normal 
rules of contractual interpretation; the Act’s goal was to 
put arbitration on a par with other contracts and 
eliminate any vestige of old rules disfavoring arbitration.  
Arbitration depends on agreement, and nothing beats 
normal rules of contract law to determine what the 
parties’ agreement entails.47 
 
 43. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686 (1996); 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995); Allied-
Bruce, 513 U.S. at 271-72; Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10-11; Fazio, 340 F.3d at 392-
93. 
 44. 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
 45. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281.  See also Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687 
(stating that “courts may not . . . invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws 
applicable only to arbitration provisions”). 
 46. Stone v. Doerge, 328 F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that federal 
law affects the “extent to which state law may specify special rules for arbitration: 
any rule of state law disfavoring or prohibiting arbitration for a class of 
transactions is preempted, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract”). 
 47. Id. (citations omitted).  The court also states that “generally applicable 
rules of New York contract law govern, but any rules of state law that give special 
treatment to arbitration agreements are inapplicable.”  Id.  See also Fazio, 340 F.3d 
at 393; Great Earth Co. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 889 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that 
state law determines whether the agreement to arbitrate was validly obtained and 
10
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The FAA leaves state courts to use the contract law of their 
state to interpret the validity of the agreement to arbitrate itself.  
The federal policy requiring liberal construction of arbitration 
clauses mandates that state courts construe applicable law in favor 
of arbitration.48 
B.  State Contract Law: Interpreting the Validity of Arbitration Clauses 
Before a court is justified in granting a motion to compel 
arbitration, it must engage in a two-step process governed by state 
rather than federal law.49  First, the court must determine whether a 
valid agreement to arbitrate exists and then whether the issues 
involved fall within the scope of the agreement.50  A court may 
invalidate an arbitration agreement for the same reasons it might 
invalidate any contract—including forgery, unconscionability, or 
lack of consideration.51  The Stone court notes that mandating 
courts to favor arbitration when possible is not the same as 
requiring courts to “foist arbitration on parties who have not 
 
the FAA preempts any state laws that are specific to arbitration); Doctor’s Assocs., 
517 U.S. at 686-87; First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
 48. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 992 F.2d 386, 388 (1st 
Cir. 1993) (stating that policy favoring arbitration “applies whether the problem at 
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, 
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability”). 
 49. See Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, U.S., L.L.C. v. Nackel, 346 F.3d 360, 365 
(2nd Cir. 2003) (stating that before “compelling arbitration, the district court 
must first determine two threshold issues that are governed by state rather than 
federal law”:  first, whether or not the parties entered into a contractually valid 
arbitration agreement; and second, whether the dispute itself falls within the 
scope of the agreement).  See also Fazio, 340 F.3d at 393 (citing Stout v. J.D. 
Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000)); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S 614, 628 (1985).  The Sixth Circuit said in Stout 
that “[w]hen considering a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration 
under the Act, a court has four tasks: first, it must determine whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate; second, it must determine the scope of that agreement.”  Stout, 
228 F.3d at 714.  The court went on to add two more prongs to the analysis by 
saying that “third, if federal statutory claims are asserted, it must consider whether 
Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court 
concludes that some, but not all of the claims in the action are subject to 
arbitration, it must determine whether to stay the remainder of the proceedings 
pending arbitration.”  Id.  See also Bratt Enters., Inc., v. Nobel Int’l Ltd., 338 F.3d 
609, 612 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that “a court must engage in a limited review to 
determine whether the dispute is arbitrable; meaning that a valid agreement to 
arbitrate exists between the parties and that the specific dispute falls within the 
substantive scope of that agreement”). 
 50. Cap Gemini, 346 F.3d. at 365. 
 51. Fazio, 340 F.3d at 393. 
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genuinely agreed to that device.”52  While that may be true, given 
the FAA’s strong policy favoring arbitration and the equally 
powerful policy favoring the freedom to contract as one of the 
fundamental tenets underlying American jurisprudence, 
convincing a court to invalidate an arbitration agreement is 
difficult.53 
1.  Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts 
Contracts of adhesion may contain arbitration agreements.  
Because the contracts this article discusses are generally between an 
MCO and one consumer, usually a patient, the analysis will focus 
on what is necessary to enforce a valid adhesion contract. 
Simply put, an adhesion contract is a contract in which one 
party dictates the terms of the agreement to the other party, and 
the other party has no voice in its formulation.54  Legal scholars and 
courts have developed more detailed definitions, including: 
(1) a standardized (typed or printed) form document (2) 
drafted by, or on behalf of, one party which (3) 
participates routinely in numerous like transactions and 
(4) presents the form to the other “adhering” party on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis; (5) the adhering party enters into 
few transactions of the type in question, and (6) the 
adhering party signs the form after dickering over the few 
terms, if any, that are open to bargaining.55 
One scholar characterized the process of entering into a 
contract of adhesion as being “not one of haggle or cooperative 
process but rather of a fly and flypaper.”56 
One commonly cited negative aspect of adhesion contracts is 
 
 52. Stone v. Doerge, 328 F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 53. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 36-37 (stating that the Supreme Court has 
broadly endorsed the enforcement of adhesive pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
and has created a “doctrine of rigorous enforcement” of pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses); Haydock & Henderson, supra note 10, at 175 (stating that judicial 
opinions and congressional action through the FAA show clear support of use of 
methods of alternative dispute resolution instead of litigation to resolve issues). 
 54. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4 (1993). 
 55. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 55 (citing Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177 (1983)). Professor 
Schwartz notes that he refers only to six of the seven factors Professor Rakoff uses 
in his original definition, omitting the last component that “the adhering party’s 
primary obligation is the payment of money,” because Professor Schwartz feels 
that Professor Rakoff’s analysis applies to not only consumer contracts, but 
contracts of employment as well.  Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1191 n.61. 
 56. Arthur Leff, Contract as a Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 143 (1970). 
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that the drafters, usually a much larger entity than the adhering 
party, may draft the contract to protect their best interests, making 
it less likely that the adhering party’s expectations will be met.57  
Most analyses of adhesion contracts also include an evaluation of 
the disparity of bargaining power between the contract’s drafter 
and the adherent that often accompanies such agreements.58  
Additionally, there is likely to be “disparate knowledge” between 
the parties, causing the adhering party to be disadvantaged by a 
lack of information about a certain term and, in the case of 
arbitration, about the likelihood and nature of any future disputes 
that may arise.59  Courts closely examine those situations in which 
the contracting parties have conflicting interests, making it more 
likely that the stronger party might take advantage of the adhering 
party by skewing the terms in its favor.60 
While there are clearly issues of fairness raised by adhesion 
contracts, scholars note that there is nothing inherently wrong with 
them.  Furthermore, many if not most daily, common transactions 
involve contracts drafted by one party and presented on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.61 
Plaintiffs in health care contracts cases often try to invalidate 
arbitration clauses on the basis of unconscionability.62  Patients 
make some of the following arguments when attacking an 
arbitration clause: an individual was forced to sign the agreement 
and had no meaningful choice because the service at the heart of 
the contract was public or essential; the arbitration clause binds 
one party but not the other and is therefore not mutual; it is 
prohibitively costly for an individual to participate in the 
arbitration process; the arbitration process or the arbitrator is not 
neutral or independent; or the clause unreasonably reduces an 
individual’s rights, for example, by denying remedies.63 
 
 57. PERILLO, supra note 54, § 1.4. 
 58. Schwartz, supra note 8, 55. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 56. 
 61. PERILLO, supra note 54, § 29.10.  See also id. § 1.4 (stating that “[adhesion 
contracts exist] in many of the transactions of vast scale that are of great 
importance to the functioning of the economy” and that they are a “part of the 
fabric of our society.  [Contracts of adhesion] should neither be praised nor 
denounced by the legal scholar”). 
 62. While there are many other contract-based challenges to arbitration 
clauses, unconscionability is most relevant to the discussion of procedural 
safeguards and due process rights, and the article will focus on it. 
 63. See Roger S. Haydock, Arbitration, in MINNESOTA PRACTICE (forthcoming 
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2.  Unconscionability Analysis 
Courts have defined unconscionability as “an absence of 
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with 
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other 
party.”64  Courts have further tried to clarify the concept by 
distinguishing between procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.65  Procedural unconscionability relates to the 
bargaining process resulting in the agreement, while substantive 
unconscionability examines whether the terms of the agreement 
itself are oppressive.66  To invalidate an agreement to arbitrate, a 
court must find that there is both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.67 
Procedural unconscionability exists when the parties to a 
contract did not freely bargain for it.68  Indications of procedural 
unconscionability generally fall into two categories: lack of 
voluntariness and lack of knowledge.69  To determine whether 
there was a lack of voluntariness in forming the contract, courts 
look at “the use of high-pressure tactics, coercion, oppression, or 
threats short of duress, or by a great imbalance between the parties’ 
bargaining power.”70  Non-negotiable terms on the stronger party’s 
side, or prevention of the weaker party from negotiating more 
favorable terms, denotes unequal bargaining power.71  The terms 
might prevent the weaker party from negotiating such things as 
market factors or timing.72  Lack of knowledge manifests in the 
classic forms of small print, indecipherable or ambiguous language, 
or lack of the opportunity to study the contract and ask about its 
terms.73  Obvious disparities in sophistication, knowledge, and 
experience between the parties may lead to procedural 
unconscionability.74 
 
publication) (manuscript at 12-13, on file with author). 
 64. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 
1965). 
 65. Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 72 P.3d 877, 882 (Idaho 2003). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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On the other hand, substantive unconscionability focuses 
solely on the term or provision at issue in a particular case.75  
Courts have long drawn on a definition dating back to eighteenth-
century England stating that a substantively unconscionable 
bargain is one “no [person] in [his or her] senses and not under 
delusion would make on the one hand, and . . . no honest and fair 
[person] would accept on the other.”76  Courts must consider the 
purpose and effect of the terms at issue, whether those terms are 
oppressive or exceedingly one-sided in light of the needs of both 
parties, the commercial setting in which the parties executed the 
agreement, and the reasonableness of the terms at the time the 
parties contracted.77 
Another specific concern arising in relation to arbitration 
clauses in all kinds of contracts is that because the transaction 
might center around wages, price, or medical services provided, 
and the arbitration clause may not be at the essence of the 
transaction, the adhering party is not likely to pay much attention 
to the clause.78  Even if average citizens do read and understand the 
clause, most probably do not have a great deal of experience with 
either arbitration or litigation, a fact that might lead to an 
undervaluation of the right to a judicial forum.79 
Plaintiffs have challenged many arbitration clauses on the 
grounds of unconscionability, but the challenges usually fail.80  This 
is likely due to the string of United States Supreme Court decisions 
making “it clear that arbitration is a preferred method of dispute 
resolution.”81  Courts have held that an arbitration clause requiring 
“a forum with excessively high fees is unconscionable in a 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.; see also PERILLO, supra note 54, at § 29.4 (quoting Earl of Chesterfield 
v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch. 1750)). 
 77. Lovey, 72 P.3d at 883.  See also PERILLO, supra note 54, at § 29.4 (stating 
that under Official Comment 1 to the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302, “the 
ultimate question is ‘whether, in the light of general commercial background and 
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so 
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of 
the making of the contract’ ”). 
 78. Schwartz, supra note 8, at 56-57. 
 79. Id. at 57. 
 80. PERILLO, supra note 54, at § 29.4 (citing Young v. Jim Walter Homes, 110 
F. Supp. 2d 1344 (M.D. Ala. 2000); Green Tree Fin. Corp. of Ala. v. Wampler, 749 
So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1999); Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D. Del. 
1999); Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 28 P.3d 823 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)). 
 81. PERILLO, supra note 54, § 29.4. 
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consumer transaction with a relatively small amount at issue.”82  
However, “the mere fact that a party cannot afford the normal 
arbitration fees does not create a defense of unconscionability.”83 
In a related matter, courts have held that employment 
contracts containing arbitration clauses that bind only the 
employee but not the employer are unconscionable for lack of 
mutuality.84  In an unpublished California Court of Appeals case, 
the court held that an arbitration clause in an employment 
contract was procedurally unconscionable because signing it was a 
condition of being hired, and the clause was substantively 
unconscionable because it did not require the employer to submit 
its claims to arbitration.85  The court also considered that the clause 
required the employee to pay one-half of the fees for arbitration 
and required that the arbitration take place before judges that 
charged high prices.86 
Pre-dispute arbitration clauses contained in adhesion contracts 
raise issues of fairness and due process, but they are permissible 
and enforceable.87  Reflecting the analysis outlined above, courts 
will generally uphold arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts as 
long as the arbitration terms are not procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable.88  Most courts will protect parties to an adhesion 
contract involving public or essential services if the parties have 
greatly disparate bargaining power, there was no opportunity for 
negotiation, and the parties could not obtain services elsewhere.89 
C.  How the Courts Have Interpreted Arbitration Clauses in Health- 
Related Contracts: Case Law 
The Supreme Court of the United States has not directly 
addressed the validity of an agreement to arbitrate in health care 
contracts.90  The Court has addressed the issue of arbitration 
 
 82. Id. (citing Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. 1998)). 
 83. Id. (citing Fleetwood Enters., Inc., v. Bruno, 784 So. 2d 277 (Ala. 2000)). 
 84. Id. (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs. Inc., 6 P.3d 669 
(Cal. 2000)). 
 85. Id. (citing McCoy v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. App. 4th 354 (2001)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 681 (1996). 
 88. See Haydock, supra note 63, at 7. 
 89. Id. at 11. 
 90. While not directly related to the focus on patients’ rights that this article 
takes, the Supreme Court’s decision in PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., v. Book, 123 S. 
Ct. 1531 (2003), might be of interest.  This case arose out of a lawsuit brought by 
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clauses, but has not made a distinction between patients as 
consumers of health care and other kinds of consumers.91  
However, the Supreme Court has approached arbitration clauses 
with a great deal of deference, and each of the Justices who has 
considered the issue has recognized the benefits of a well-run 
arbitration system.92 
The federal courts of appeals have dealt with the question of 
whether arbitration clauses in health care contracts should be 
enforceable on a limited basis, concluding generally that such 
clauses should and will be enforceable.  For example, in Chappel v. 
Laboratory Corp. of America, the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of 
an arbitration clause in an ERISA-governed health benefits plan.93  
The Chappel court stated, “if the plan contains an arbitration clause, 
the plaintiff must arbitrate the dispute in accordance with the 
clause in order to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing 
suit . . . unless he can show that the arbitration clause is 
unenforceable or invalid.”94  The plaintiff’s argument was 
threefold: first, that the plan waived its right to arbitrate by first 
 
physicians against MCOs that had failed to reimburse the doctors for patient 
services.  Id. at 1533.  The doctors alleged, inter alia, that the organizations 
violated the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).  Id.  
When the MCOs moved to compel arbitration as per their agreements with the 
doctors, the district court denied the motion stating, “the arbitration clauses [in 
question] prohibited awards of ‘punitive damages,’ and hence an arbitrator lacked 
the ability to award treble damages under RICO.”  Id. at 1532.  The Eleventh 
Circuit agreed with the district court that given the remedial limitations in the 
arbitration clauses, “[T]he plaintiff[s] may not be able to obtain meaningful relief 
for allegations of statutory violations in an arbitration forum.”  Id. at 1534 (quoting 
In re Managed Care Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1005 (S.D. Fla. 2000)).  In writing 
for the Court, Justice Scalia held that since the remedial limitations in the 
arbitration clauses themselves were ambiguous, and because the Court would have 
to speculate as to how an arbitrator might construe the remedial limitations, that it 
was not for the Court to resolve that ambiguity.  Id. at 1535-36.  The case was 
remanded for further proceedings, and at the time of this publication has not 
been decided.  In CIGNA HealthCare of St. Louis, Inc. v. Kaiser, a Seventh Circuit 
case, health care providers brought a claim against a group of affiliated 
corporations that administered benefits, CIGNA, alleging that it installed a 
computer program for calculating the amount it owed that resulted in systematic 
underpayment.  294 F.3d 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 91. Haydock Interview, supra note 6. 
 92. Haydock & Henderson, supra note 10, at 175-76 (stating that all of the 
twenty-four different justices who have been members of the Court since 1960 
“were members of the majority upholding arbitration in at least one case during 
their tenure, and [the majority of the Justices] were members of the majority a 
number of times”). 
 93. 232 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 94. Id. at 724. 
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litigating the dispute in federal court; second, that the clause 
should be invalid because some of its terms were more restrictive 
than the statutory rights guaranteed to plan participants under 
ERISA; and third, that employment contracts are not governed 
under the FAA.95  The court rejected all three claims and enforced 
the arbitration clause.96 
To waive the right to arbitrate, the defendant must have 
known of their right to arbitrate, “acted inconsistently with that 
right, and, in doing so, prejudiced Chappel by their actions.”97  The 
court said that nothing in the defendant’s litigation behavior was 
inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.98  As for the more 
restrictive language in the arbitration agreement, the court held 
that a cost-sharing provision did not render the arbitration 
agreement unenforceable.99  Finally, whether the plaintiff could 
prove that the clause was part of the employment contract and thus 
not governed by the FAA, he would still be required under the law 
of contract to arbitrate in accordance with the clause.100  The court 
did allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint to state a claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty by failing to adequately notify him of the 
existence and terms of the arbitration clause.101  The court 
reasoned that because mandatory arbitration was part of the plan’s 
claim procedure, and because the claimant would have taken 
certain steps to obtain external review of his claim, the plan should 
have brought the arbitration clause to the claimant’s attention.102 
In Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield,103 the Tenth Circuit 
considered whether an arbitration award fell within the public 
policy exception to enforcement of arbitration awards.104  In that 
case, the parties mutually agreed to arbitrate a claim against the 
health care organization after it declined to pay for the plaintiff’s 
 
 95. Id. at 724-25. 
 96. Id. at 724. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 725.  Compare Chappel, 232 F.3d 719 with Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that a claim under 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) can be subjected to compulsory 
arbitration, and the plaintiff was bound by the agreement unless he could show an 
“inherent conflict between arbitration and the ADEA’s underlying purposes”). 
 100. Chappel, 232 F.3d at 725. 
 101. Id. at 726. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 988 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 104. Id. 
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son’s liver transplant.105  The arbitration panel found that the 
company was not legally obligated to pay for the transplant.106  
Because the Seymours claimed that Blue Cross unilaterally 
modified the original policy without receiving a written agreement 
from the Seymours, the court would not enforce the arbitration 
award, finding it counter to Utah public policy.107  Relying on 
federal policy dictating that a federal court should do everything it 
can to avoid overturning an arbitration award,108 the Seymour court 
held that “as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or 
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his 
authority . . . error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”109 
Among state courts, California has had many cases involving 
various issues related to health care arbitration clauses come before 
its judiciary, paving the way for those that have followed.110  In 1976, 
the California Supreme Court reversed the California Court of 
Appeals in the seminal case of Madden v. Kaiser Foundation 
Hospitals.111  This case involved a state employee covered by a group 
health plan negotiated by his employer who brought a medical 
 
 105. Id. at 1022. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764 (1983) 
(stating that “a federal court may not overrule an arbitrator’s decision simply 
because the court believes its own interpretation of the contract would be a better 
one”)). 
 109. Seymour, 988 F.2d at 1022-23 (quoting United Paperworks Int’l Union v. 
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). 
 110. See generally Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 972 
(Cal. 1997) (presuming arbitratability); Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 
1178 (Cal. 1976) (finding that an agent or representative has the implied authority 
to agree to arbitration of malpractice claims for enrolled employees); Zolezzi v. 
Pacificare of California, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 526, 539 n.11 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding 
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not prevent the Federal Arbitration Act 
from preempting application of statutory disclosure requirements for arbitration 
clauses in health care service plans found in California state law); Pagarigan v. 
Libby Care Center, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 895 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that 
arbitration clause in nursing home admissions contract was unenforceable because 
adult children of resident who signed the agreement did not have authority as 
agents to bind the resident); Smith v. PacifiCare Behavioral Health of California, 
Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 140, 162 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that where health service 
plan was engaged in the business of insurance and was thus governed by the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, an arbitration provision in a health services contract that 
did not satisfy the statutory disclosure requirements was not enforceable); Warren-
Guthrie v. Health Net, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260, 266 (Ct. App. 2000) (state law 
allowing a court to disregard an arbitration clause due to the possibility of 
inconsistent rulings was preempted by the FAA). 
 111. 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976). 
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malpractice claim against the health plan.112  When Kaiser moved to 
compel arbitration per the agreement it negotiated with the State 
Employees Retirement System Board of Administration, the 
plaintiff contended that the arbitration provision did not bind her 
because she did not personally contract for it.113  The court then 
considered whether an agent or representative, contracting for 
medical services on behalf of a group of employees, has the implied 
authority to agree to arbitration of malpractice claims for enrolled 
employees.114 
The California Supreme Court made several bold statements 
about the practice of arbitration.115  The court stated that while in 
the past courts sometimes regarded arbitration as suspect, today 
arbitration is an accepted mode of dispute resolution.116  Further, 
the court held that employers could enter into contracts related to 
medical services on behalf of their employees, and that simply 
because an arbitration agreement is embedded in an adhesion 
contract does not make it invalid.117  After all, the parties 
negotiating for the arbitration contract had equal bargaining 
power.118  The Madden court finally noted that in negotiating the 
arbitration clause, the employer (or state board) was merely 
providing “a forum for enforcement of the rights of enrolled 
employees rather than a substantive limitation of them.”119  Along 
those same lines, the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that 
the arbitration provision violated her constitutional right to a jury 
trial, because persons can freely contract to resolve disputes 
through arbitration rather than by juries.120 
In 1997, the California Supreme Court considered an 
arbitration provision in another health care contract in Engalla v. 
Permanente Medical Group, Inc.121  The court first looked to see if the 
arbitration clause itself was unconscionable.122  The court noted in 
its analysis that in addition to the doctrine of unconscionability 
 
 112. Id. at 1180-81. 
 113. Id. at 1181. 
 114. Id. at 1180. 
 115. See id. (stating that “courts in the past regarded arbitration as an unusual 
and suspect procedure”). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997). 
 122. Id. at  924. 
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derived from contract law, HMOs were regulated by a state law that 
required that “all contracts made in connection with a health 
service plan be ‘fair, reasonable, and consistent with the objectives’ 
of that statute.”123  Therefore, the court concluded, “HMOs had a 
special obligation not to impose contracts on their subscribers that 
are one-sided and lacking in fundamental fairness.”124  While the 
court acknowledged that the contract had some of the attributes of 
adhesion, it held that the agreement was not unconscionable 
because the plaintiff’s argument did not revolve around any defect 
or one-sidedness in its contractual provisions;125 rather, the plaintiff 
argued that the HMO had set up a system of arbitration inherently 
unfair to its claimants.126  The court then remanded the case on the 
issues of fraud and waiver.127 
In another prominent state court case, Broemmer v. Abortion 
Services of Phoenix, Ltd., the Supreme Court of Arizona revisited a 
decision holding that an adhesion contract, which had required 
Broemmer to arbitrate a medical malpractice claim, thereby 
waiving her right to a jury trial, was unconscionable.128  To 
determine whether the clause was enforceable, the court examined 
whether the provision fell within the reasonable expectations of the 
plaintiff.129  Because of the complexities of that particular situation, 
the court chose not to enforce the agreement to arbitrate, stating 
that the contract itself fell outside Broemmer’s reasonable 
expectations.130  The court said that there was neither a 
conspicuous or explicit waiver of her right to a jury trial, nor any 
evidence that she waived the right knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently.131  The court also noted that at the time of the 
decision Broemmer was still not sure what arbitration entailed, and 
that severe emotional strain, coupled with her lack of education, 
contributed to the court’s assessment that the clause did not 
 
 123. Id. (citing Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act, CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE, § 1367, subd. (h) (West 2004)). 
 124. Id. at 924. 
 125. Id. at 925. 
 126. Id. at 925.  Kaiser, the HMO in this case, reserved an unlimited right to 
veto arbitrators proposed by the other party.  Id.  The plaintiffs also argued that 
Kaiser had “an unfair advantage as a ‘repeat player’ in arbitration, possessing 
information on arbitrators that [they] themselves lacked.”  Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992). 
 129. Id  at 1016. 
 130. Id. at 1017. 
 131. Id. 
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coincide with her reasonable expectations.132 
The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, went the other 
direction, compelling arbitration in a case between a patient and 
her physician.133  In considering whether such an agreement was 
valid under the Tennessee Arbitration Act,134 the court examined 
whether the clause was contained in a contract of adhesion, and if 
so, whether the contract was enforceable.135  The test for 
enforceability used by the Buraczynski court was to ascertain 
whether the terms of the contract were beyond the reasonable 
expectations of an ordinary person.136  In this case, two different 
plaintiffs brought medical malpractice claims against the 
defendant, Dr. Edward Eyring.137  Since both patients had signed 
agreements to arbitrate with the physician, he moved to compel 
arbitration.138 
The court acknowledged that, in general, courts around the 
nation are reluctant to enforce arbitration agreements between 
patients and health care providers.139  The court qualified this 
statement by citing some specific strikes against certain types of 
agreements.140  For instance, courts do not favor agreements 
hidden within other types of contracts that do not afford patients 
an opportunity to question the terms or purpose of the 
agreement.141  This is particularly true when a patient is required to 
accept the terms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and when the 
agreements give the health care provider an unequal advantage in 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 314 (Tenn. 1996). 
 134. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302(a) (1995). 
 135. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 320. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 316-17. 
 138. Id. at 317. 
 139. Id. at 320-21 (citing Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 
P.2d 1013, 1016 (Ariz. 1992); William F. Robinson, M.D., Ltd. v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 
1259, 1261 (Nev. 1985) (refusing to enforce an arbitration agreement found 
within a clinic admission form that gave the patient no option to revoke the 
agreement and regain the right to a jury trial); Benyon v. Garden Grove Med. 
Group, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 150, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (refusing to enforce an 
arbitration clause where the group health insurance plan had the unilateral right 
to reject an arbitrator’s decision without cause and to require another arbitration 
before a panel of three physicians when the insured is unaware of the provision 
and that the provision required the insured to pay half the costs of both 
arbitrations)). 
 140. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 321. 
 141. Id. 
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the arbitration process itself.142 
While the Buraczynski court conceded that the arbitration 
agreement was contained in a contract of adhesion and presented 
to the plaintiffs on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, it still chose to enforce 
the agreement.143  The court noted that the arbitration clause was 
on a separate page attached to an explanation about arbitration 
and an encouragement to discuss questions about the agreement 
with Dr. Eyring.144  The arbitration agreement equally bound Dr. 
Eyring, and each side in the dispute had an opportunity to choose 
the arbitrator.  In addition, the arbitration agreement included a 
ten-point, capital letter, red message directly above the signature 
line.  The message read, “by signing this contract, you are giving up 
your right to a jury or court trial” on any malpractice claim.145  
Patients also had the right to revoke the agreement for any reason 
within thirty days of its execution and regain the right to a jury 
trial.146  Finally, the agreement did not limit the doctor’s liability for 
negligence, but “merely shifted the disputes to a different 
forum.”147  With these procedural safeguards in place, the court felt 
that the arbitration procedure itself did not offer an unfair 
advantage to the physician.148 
The Buraczynski court also engaged in a public policy analysis, 
considering whether the arbitration agreements between physicians 
and patients were void ab initio as against public policy.149  While the 
court acknowledged the “unique relationship” between physician 
and patient, it thought that arbitration was an advantageous 
relationship because it was quicker, less expensive, relieves court 
congestion, and in cases where the provisions did not limit liability, 
simply provided a different forum for resolving disputes.150 
Other states have dealt with the issue of the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements in health care contracts, usually finding the 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 319. 
 150. Id. at 318-19 (citing Stanley D. Henderson, Contractual Problems in the 
Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REV. 947, 956 
(1972); Timothy E. Travers, Annotation, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims, 84 
A.L.R.3d 375, 377 (1978 & Supp. 1995)). 
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arbitration agreements enforceable.151  There are some cases in 
which they are not enforceable, including when the arbitration is 
prohibitively costly,152 the clause was proposed on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis, the clause was “buried” on the tenth page of an eleven-page 
agreement, the clause was written in the same size font as the rest 
of the agreement, and the clause did not adequately describe how 
the arbitration clause would work.153  The Buraczynski opinion is 
helpful in providing a list of possible dos and don’ts for health care 
organizations in drafting arbitration clauses. 
IV. MANAGING CONFLICTING GOALS 
THROUGH PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
Most people would not deny that health care providers and 
insurers face a myriad of complex issues in trying to provide 
adequate care for their patients while simultaneously containing 
the cost.  As previously noted, many operators in the health care 
and health insurance industries are requiring customers to agree to 
binding arbitration as a condition of both using hospital services 
 
 151. See, e.g., Cent. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Fox, No. 1011121, 2003 WL 
21480608 (Ala. June 27, 2003) (enforcing an arbitration agreement between 
health insurer and insured but invalidating “condition precedent” to appealability 
of the decision because insurer waived conditions by moving to compel 
arbitration); Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 381 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) (holding 
that arbitration clause in HMO contract applied to a wrongful death claim 
brought by a non-party spouse as an “heir”); Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life & 
Health, 23 P.3d 1249, 1255 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that an arbitration 
clause was not void for lack of mutuality as long as the parties have provided each 
other with adequate consideration beyond the promise to arbitrate); Consol. Res. 
Healthcare Fund v. Fenelus, 853 So. 2d 500, 504-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) 
(stating that an arbitration clause in nursing home admission agreement was not 
unconscionable and thus enforceable even though clause did not allow signor a 
chance to affirmatively release his right to trial); Murphy v. Mid-West Nat’l Life 
Ins. Co. of Tenn., 78 P.3d 766, 768 (Idaho 2003) (holding that while there was no 
showing that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable, the prohibitive costs 
of arbitration rendered the provision unenforceable in a case where the fees were 
$2500 for a case worth $10,000); Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 72 P.3d 
877, 889 (Idaho 2003) (holding that the arbitration agreement in BlueShield 
policy was not procedurally or substantively unconscionable); Jozwiak v. N. Mich. 
Hosp. Inc., 586 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that repeal of 
Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act did not retroactively invalidate arbitration 
agreement). 
 152. Colo. Permanente Med. Group, P.C. v. Evans, 926 P.2d 1218, 1226 (Colo. 
1996) (stating that an HMO must comply with the requirements for enforceable 
arbitration clauses as laid out in Colorado’s Health Care Availability Act). 
 153. Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders, Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2003). 
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and applying for health insurance.154  The justification for these 
agreements is generally the goal of furthering “two sometimes 
mutually exclusive public policies.”155  Those public policies include 
lowering medical malpractice insurance premiums by decreasing 
the cost and frequency of medical malpractice litigation and 
adequately compensating those injured by health care providers’ 
negligence.156  Requiring consumers of managed care plans to 
agree to an arbitration process in an adhesion contract raises 
questions rooted in the conflict between being fair to patients and 
administering effective, economically efficient care.157  Binding 
arbitration may provide a superior alternative to litigation for both 
patients and managed care organizations.158  It falls on the 
shoulders of the proponents of arbitration to demonstrate to 
patients and consumers that it is fair and equitable, and that the 
outcomes are commensurate to that of litigation in the vast 
majority of situations. 
There are two competing viewpoints regarding the 
enforceability of arbitration clauses in health care contracts.159  The 
“pro-arbitration” approach focuses on the advantages and efficacy 
of using an alternative method of dispute resolution while 
sometimes neglecting to address the necessity for valid contract 
formation.160  ADR opponents, on the other hand, focus on the 
illegitimacy of the arbitration agreement itself while often failing to 
consider the benefits of ADR.161   
 
 154. See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 53; Symposium, ADR in Health Care, 16 
WHITTIER L. REV. 61 (1995). 
 155. Weldon E. Havens, Medical Arbitration Agreements, 41 ORANGE COUNTY 
LAWYER 14, 14 (1999). 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Carter, supra note 1, at 433 (stating that while arbitration is considered 
to be speedier and less costly than litigation, there is concern, particularly in the 
HMO field, that patients, in losing their right to a judicial hearing, will lose their 
right to a fair hearing). 
 158. See Allied-Bruce Terminix, Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) 
(citing Congress’ intent that arbitration appeal to businesses, corporations, and 
individuals). 
 159. See Havens, supra note 155, at 15 (stating medical arbitration contracts 
ensure the continued availability of professional liability insurance to health care 
providers, which in turn provides the best source of available funds to compensate 
victims of medical malpractice). 
 160. See id. (providing support for arbitration clauses). 
 161. See Jennifer Gillespie, Physician-Patient Arbitration Agreements: Procedural 
Safeguards May Not Be Enough, 1997 J. DISP. RESOL. 119, 119 (1997) (stating that 
many patients are being presented with the choice of signing an arbitration 
agreement or forgoing treatment); Carter, supra note 1, at 423 (asserting that the 
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The “pro-arbitration” approach is rooted in the belief that 
arbitration is always better than litigation.  Under this approach, 
analysis of contract formation may be subverted to the end goal of 
arbitration.  At its negative extreme, this favors businesses over 
consumers and seeks to protect large, powerful entities drafting 
what amount to adhesion contracts that are likely to favor their own 
interests and shift as much risk as possible to the adhering party.162  
In a more positive light, however, those who favor arbitration for 
settling claims feel that these clauses benefit plaintiffs in a tort 
system that large corporations with vast resources can easily 
manipulate.163 
The contrasting approach focuses on the fact that plaintiffs 
have forgone access to the tort system instead of on the efficacy and 
fairness of the arbitration itself.  These ADR opponents apparently 
assume that giving up the right to a civil jury trial somehow 
obliterates one’s ability to seek redress for wrongs.164  Certainly 
scrutinizing the manner in which parties form arbitration 
agreements deserves attention, but it is not the only consideration.  
Giving people access to a fair system in which they have an 
opportunity to be heard is the ultimate goal of the American justice 
system.  Undeniably, most patients would never see the inside of a 
courtroom if litigation was their only option. 
The key is to seek balance.  Arbitration may benefit all 
involved in the long run, but notions of fair play demand that 
people validly contract to use arbitration rather than litigation.165  
Perhaps more importantly, people need to feel that they are being 
treated fairly within whatever system they have available to them to 
resolve disputes, and health care providers can take steps to 
safeguard due process as well as to educate patients and consumers 
about the benefits of arbitration over litigation. 
 
power of HMOs may skew the arbitration process and “pile poor legal care on top 
of poor medical care”). 
 162. Haydock Interview, supra note 6. 
 163. See generally Haydock & Henderson, supra note 10 (laying out the essential 
elements to a fair dispute resolution system). 
 164. See generally Schwartz, supra note 8, at 117 (stating that settlements 
arguably deprive the public of a jury trial); Spencer, supra note 2, at D1 (reflecting 
that critics of arbitration provisions equate no right to trial or appeal as a second-
rate justice system). 
 165. Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) 
(Kennard, J., concurring) (stating that private arbitration may resolve disputes 
faster and cheaper than judicial proceedings, but that it may also become an 
instrument of injustice if imposed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis). 
26
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/1
GALLE-FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  10:41 PM 
2004] AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE IN HEALTH CARE 995 
A.  Education 
Health care organizations must legitimize arbitration 
agreements in the eyes of their patients by giving people more 
confidence in them.  This can happen only through education.  At 
this point, many people fear arbitration agreements because they 
think that if something happens to them they will not be able to do 
anything about it.  This is not true; arbitration agreements merely 
change the forum of the dispute.  Before people will want to 
engage in ADR, they must understand the trade-off; while they are 
giving up one right, they are gaining another of equal or greater 
value.  Health care providers must help their patients understand 
that if a problem arises, they can still bring a claim, and that the 
system in which they may do so has its own set of procedural rules 
and ways of ensuring fair evaluation and compensation.  Patients 
should know how and why parties choose a neutral arbitrator and 
what the likely credentials of the neutral would be. 
Health care providers at all levels need to provide written 
information and access to staff who are available to answer any 
questions patients may have about submitting a claim to ADR.  If 
patients have a positive attitude about ADR, then whatever 
additional staff and materials providers would have to pay for 
would more than pay for themselves in time saved and initial stages 
of litigation avoided. 
B.  Careful Drafting 
As the case law shows, providers must carefully draft 
arbitration agreements to withstand judicial scrutiny.  Not only is 
the content of these clauses crucial, but so are their location within 
the contract and their visual appearance.166 
C.  Content 
Because the use of ADR is growing and because an ADR 
program was one of the proposed elements of the “Patient’s Bill of 
Rights,”167 a multi-disciplinary commission convened in the late 
 
 166. See Havens, supra note 155, at 15 (describing that California requires 
arbitration agreements to appear in the first article of the contract and that an 
additional warning in at least ten-point red font is to appear immediately before 
the signature line). 
 167. Aimee E. Bierman, A Modest Proposal:  Model Arbitration Provisions in the Age 
of Managed Care, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 173, 174 n.6 (1999) (stating that the 
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1990s to develop guidelines for a model ADR system in the medical 
field.168  The commission’s proposed agreement included the 
following:169  the scope of the agreement, who would administer the 
process, some procedural elements relating to when and how the 
process would work, how the parties choose neutral arbitrators, and 
how fees are paid.170  The agreement should also explicitly state that 
by signing, one is giving up the right to a court or jury trial, but also 
that the agreement is not a prerequisite to health care, and that the 
agreement is revocable within a certain time frame.171 
The Buraczynski court provided valuable guidance by 
specifically mentioning both the positive and negative aspects of 
the arbitration agreement.172  Using the proposed agreement above 
and the Buraczynski discussion, the following sections provide 
 
Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution (CHCDR) issued a report to 
President  Bill Clinton in March of 1998 urging the adoption of the “Patient’s Bill 
of Rights”). 
 168. Id. at 174. The goals of CHCDR, which was composed of representatives 
from the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, and the 
American Arbitration Association, were to promote due process safeguards and 
encourage greater understanding, awareness, and acceptance of ADR in the 
context of managed care.  Id. at 174-75. 
 169. The actual text of the proposed agreement read: 
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Managed 
Care Organization contract, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by 
binding arbitration.  The arbitration process will be administered by 
the American Arbitration Association under its Health Care Claim 
Settlement Procedures, and judgment on the award rendered by the 
arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.  
The controversy or claim will be submitted to arbitration upon the 
written demand of one of the parties directed to the other party.  The 
arbitration process shall commence within the following time frames: 
acute emergencies—24 hours; general emergencies—72 hours; non-
emergencies—45 days.  Three (3) arbitrators will be selected, within 
ten (10) days of notice to the AAA of the existence of the dispute.  If 
either of the parties fails to agree to any of the arbitrators named, the 
AAA is empowered to appoint the arbitrator(s) as necessary.  The 
initiating party shall advance one-half of the AAA fees that are 
operative at the time of filing; the opposing party will pay the 
remainder.  By signing this agreement you are agreeing to have any 
dispute regarding health care coverage decided by the aforementioned 
arbitrators and you are giving up your right to a court or jury trial. This 
agreement to arbitrate is not a prerequisite to health care or treatment 
and it may be revoked by the member or his legal representative within 
sixty (60) days after execution by notifying the MCO in writing. 
Id. at 175-76. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Tenn. 1996). 
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additional concrete suggestions for health care providers to use in 
drafting a fair and sound arbitration agreement. 
D.  Tell Patients the Truth 
Any arbitration clause in the health care context should say 
clearly that by signing the contract, he or she is giving up the right 
to a jury trial.173  Educating patients as to what they are getting in 
return should serve to balance uneasiness they may feel in signing 
such an agreement. 
E.  Do Not Make Patients Bear a Heavy Financial Burden 
Courts do not generally look kindly on agreements that 
require the patient to bear the burden of the fees up front.174  Since 
most medical malpractice attorneys accept cases on a contingency 
fee basis, asking claimants to come up with a significant chunk of 
money at the beginning of the process may effectively make it 
impossible for them to proceed.  Thus, even if a patient stands to 
recover the money at a later point, health care providers must 
ensure that the cost of arbitration does not stand in the way of 
people bringing a claim. 
F.  Make Signing the Agreement Optional 
While the growing trend is to require patients to sign these 
agreements as a prerequisite to treatment, health care providers 
should make it optional.  Adequate education and counseling for 
patients presented with options, as well as the ability to ask 
questions of staff about ADR procedures, should counteract much 
of the reticence.  Making arbitration a choice rather than an 
obligation will serve to protect patients’ procedural due process 
rights and will bolster the legitimacy of a signed arbitration 
agreement in the unlikely event a claim should arise. 
G.  Make the Agreement Revocable 
Making the agreement revocable further ensures that a court 
will enforce it.  As with making arbitration optional, giving a patient 
the choice to revoke the agreement within a set period increases 
 
 173. Bierman, supra note 167, at 176. 
 174. Id. 
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fairness for patients.  Allowing patients to revoke an agreement 
within sixty days, for example, may seem like a risk, but the benefits 
to health care providers through increased fairness and patient 
confidence in the agreement will outweigh any possible risk. 
H.  Make the Agreements Mutual 
While courts do not always require mutuality of an arbitration 
agreement for it to be enforceable, ensuring that the agreements 
bind both patient and provider is a good idea.  The Buraczynski 
court noted this as a factor working in favor of clause 
enforceability.175 
I.  Do Not Limit Liability 
For the agreements to withstand close scrutiny, they must not 
change the health care provider’s duty to the patient in any way by 
limiting liability for a breach of that duty.176 
J.  Do Not Bury It 
Keep the arbitration agreement on a separate sheet of paper 
entitled “Physician-Patient Arbitration Agreement.”177  It either 
should be near the front of any long contract or handed to a 
patient separately while drawing his or her attention to it. 
K.  Use Big, Bold Type and Clear Language 
It is not appropriate to write an arbitration clause in fine print.  
While providers must balance the need to be clear with the desire 
not to assault patients with an aggressive typeface that gives people 
a negative impression of ADR, the agreement should be easy to 
understand and easy to see.  It might help to highlight salient 
portions such as the fact that one is giving up his right to sue, but 
not his right to be compensated for any wrong.  Providers could 
also highlight the optional nature of the agreement as well as a 
patient’s ability to revoke. 
 
 175. Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 321. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. 
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L.  Encourage People to Ask Questions 
The clause should contain not only an explanation of what 
arbitration is, but also should encourage the patient to discuss 
questions with the physician or with some person specifically 
designated for that purpose.178 
Implementing these safeguards and continuing to educate the 
public as to the benefits of arbitration versus litigation ideally will 
serve to free up the court system from unnecessary litigation 
regarding the validity of the arbitration agreements themselves.  
Health care insurers and providers should work to make their 
patients feel better about signing an arbitration agreement and 
promote fair agreements, even in the context of an adhesion 
contract.  Such steps will benefit not only the providers, but also 
patients and taxpayers through lower premiums and state health 
care costs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The medical establishment is caught between containing 
escalating costs for both patients and doctors and providing quality 
health care to patients.  One solution to managing these sometimes 
competing goals is to provide access to a viable alternative dispute 
resolution system.  Managed care organizations cannot do this, 
however, by forcing patients into forgoing the right to a jury trial 
against their will.  The health care industry can tackle this problem 
in two ways: first, by helping people understand that giving up the 
right to trial does not mean they will lose the opportunity to hold 
their providers accountable should a dispute arise; and second, by 
giving patients a choice.  Vigilantly implementing procedural 
safeguards and educating patients about arbitration will help to 
create an environment in which people trust their health insurers 
and providers, where they can receive fair treatment in an 
equitable forum, and where health care professionals, and 
ultimately taxpayers, can reserve precious time and money for what 
really matters—making patients better. 
 
 
 178. See id. 
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